Strong and Coalition - Proof Political Equilibria Under Plurality and Runoff Rule

28 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2005

See all articles by Mattias Polborn

Mattias Polborn

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Matthias Messner

University of Cologne

Date Written: June 23, 2006

Abstract

We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition - proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections.

We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Polborn, Mattias K. and Messner, Matthias, Strong and Coalition - Proof Political Equilibria Under Plurality and Runoff Rule (June 23, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=795684 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.795684

Mattias K. Polborn (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Matthias Messner

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus Magnus Platz
Cologne, NRW 50923
Germany

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