Download This PaperStrong and Coalition - Proof Political Equilibria Under Plurality and Runoff Rule
28 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2005
Date Written: June 23, 2006
Abstract
We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition - proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections.
We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.
JEL Classification: D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Polborn, Mattias K. and Messner, Matthias, Strong and Coalition - Proof Political Equilibria Under Plurality and Runoff Rule (June 23, 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=795684 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.795684
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
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