Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective

26 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2005

See all articles by Luis Garicano

Luis Garicano

IE Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Richard A. Posner

University of Chicago Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

Two recent failures of the United States intelligence system have led to the creation of high-level investigative commissions. The failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass destruction prompted the creation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. We use insights from organizational economics to analyze the principal organizational issues raised by these commissions.

Keywords: Organizational economics, intelligence reform, war on terrorism

JEL Classification: D2, D8, H1, K0, L22, L32

Suggested Citation

Garicano, Luis and Posner, Richard A., Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective (August 2005). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5186, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=796171

Luis Garicano (Contact Author)

IE Business School ( email )

Calle MarĂ­a de Molina, 11
Madrid, 28006
Spain

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Richard A. Posner

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
LBQ 611
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-9608 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
56
Abstract Views
3,272
rank
400,765
PlumX Metrics