Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective

Garicano, Luis; Posner, Richard A.

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Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5186

26 Pages Posted: 1 Sep 2005

See all articles by Luis Garicano

Luis Garicano

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IE Business School

Richard A. Posner

University of Chicago Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

Two recent failures of the United States intelligence system have led to the creation of high-level investigative commissions. The failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass destruction prompted the creation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. We use insights from organizational economics to analyze the principal organizational issues raised by these commissions.

Keywords: Organizational economics, intelligence reform, war on terrorism

JEL Classification: D2, D8, H1, K0, L22, L32

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Garicano, Luis and Garicano, Luis and Posner, Richard A., Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective (August 2005). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5186, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=796171