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Goals versus Memes: Explanation in the Theory of Cultural Evolution

PERSPECITIVES ON IMITATION, Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, eds., MIT Press, 2004

UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 05-23

25 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2005  

Mark Greenberg

UCLA School of Law and Department of Philosophy

Abstract

Darwinian theories of culture need to show that they improve upon the commonsense view that cultural change is explained by humans' skillful pursuit of their conscious goals. In order for meme theory to pull its weight, it is not enough to show that the development and spread of an idea is, broadly speaking, Darwinian, in the sense that it proceeds by the accumulation of change through the differential survival and transmission of varying elements. It could still be the case that the best explanation of why the idea has developed and spread is the conscious pursuit of human goals. Meme theory has the potential to do explanatory work in diverse ways. It can challenge the goal-based account of cultural change directly. Other possibilities for meme theory include explaining the acquisition of our goals and showing that memes and genes evolve together, each affecting the selective forces acting on the other. Raising the question of meme theory's explanatory payoff brings out the importance of the "selfish-meme" idea and the idea of non-content biases. Both have the potential to challenge the claim that our goals are in the driver's seat. In order to show that a Darwinian theory of culture is more than an idle redescription, however, it is necessary to make the case that it offers explanatory gain over its competitors, in particular over the common sense goal-based account.

Keywords: Darwin, meme, cultural evolution, explanation, selfish gene, evolutionary theory, natural selection, imitation, cultural change

Suggested Citation

Greenberg, Mark, Goals versus Memes: Explanation in the Theory of Cultural Evolution. PERSPECTIVES ON IMITATION, Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, eds., MIT Press, 2004; UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 05-23. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=797143

Mark Greenberg (Contact Author)

UCLA School of Law and Department of Philosophy ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
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Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
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