Education, Moral Hazard, and Endogenous Growth
Kobe University Working Paper No. 80
Posted: 24 Apr 1998
Date Written: 1997
Abstract
We built an overlapping generation model of endogenous growth driven by human capital formation. Young people differ in their innate abilities, but these differences are not known even by the individuals themselves when they are going through the process of education, so that there are no adverse selection problems.
JEL Classification: I21, O40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Van Long, Ngo and Shimomura, Koji, Education, Moral Hazard, and Endogenous Growth (1997). Kobe University Working Paper No. 80, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=79758
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
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