First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees

Bar-Ilan University Economics Working Paper No. 8-03

42 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2005

See all articles by Ruth Ben-Yashar

Ruth Ben-Yashar

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics

Igal Milchtaich

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2005

Abstract

A group of people with identical preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) takes a vote to decide between two alternatives. The first best voting rule is a weighted voting rule that takes into account the different individual competences, and is therefore not anonymous (i.e., the voters' identities matter). Under this rule, it is rational for group members to vote according to their true opinions, or informatively. This is not true for an anonymous voting rule, under which some group members may have an incentive to vote non-informatively. Sophisticated, strategic voters may therefore vary their voting strategies according to the voting rule used, rather than simply voting informatively. However, this paper shows that the best anonymous and monotone voting rule does not depend on whether the voters, or some of them, actually do so. A single, second best, rule gives the highest expected utility for any number of strategic voters.

Keywords: Strategic voting, informative voting, committees, information aggregation

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Ben-Yashar, Ruth and Milchtaich, Igal, First and Second Best Voting Rules in Committees (September 2005). Bar-Ilan University Economics Working Paper No. 8-03, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=798344 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.798344

Ruth Ben-Yashar

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel

Igal Milchtaich (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel

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