A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism
Public Choice, Vol. 128, pp. 147-168, 2006
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-29
FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 05-25
40 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2005
Abstract
This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. Challenging the conventional application of the basic rational agent model of crime in the context of terrorism, it considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities.
Keywords: organized crime, basic crime model, communal liability, deterrence, incapacitation, penalty enhancements, terrorism
JEL Classification: K14, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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