A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism

40 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2005  

Nuno M. Garoupa

Texas A&M University School of Law; Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Global School of Law

Jonathan Klick

University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Abstract

This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. Challenging the conventional application of the basic rational agent model of crime in the context of terrorism, it considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities.

Keywords: organized crime, basic crime model, communal liability, deterrence, incapacitation, penalty enhancements, terrorism

JEL Classification: K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno M. and Klick, Jonathan and Parisi, Francesco, A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism. Public Choice, Vol. 128, pp. 147-168, 2006; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-29; FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 05-25; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 174; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-27. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=800705

Nuno M. Garoupa (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University School of Law ( email )

1515 Commerce St.
Fort Worth, TX 76102
United States

Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Global School of Law ( email )

Lisboa
Portugal

Jonathan Klick

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)

Erasmus School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

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