Governance in the Gullies: Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi's Slums

World Development, February 2007, (Revised)

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3694

37 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2005 Last revised: 1 Oct 2013

See all articles by Saumitra Jha

Saumitra Jha

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Vijayendra Rao

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Michael Woolcock

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG); Harvard University - Kennedy School of Government; Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: September 1, 2005

Abstract

We use detailed ethnographic evidence to design and interpret a broad representative survey of 800 households in Delhi's slums, examining the processes by which residents gain access to formal government and develop their own, informal, modes of leadership. While ethnically homogeneous slums transplant rural institutions to the city, newer and ethnically diverse slums depend on informal leaders who gain their authority through political connections, education and network entrepreneurship. Education and political affiliation are more important than seniority in determining a leader's influence. Informal leaders are accessible to all slum dwellers, but formal government figures are most accessed by the wealthy and the well-connected.

Suggested Citation

Jha, Saumitra and Rao, Vijayendra and Woolcock, Michael, Governance in the Gullies: Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi's Slums (September 1, 2005). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3694. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=801504 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.801504

Saumitra Jha (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

Vijayendra Rao

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-8034 (Phone)
202-522-1153 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://vijayendrarao.org

Michael Woolcock

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
Mailstop MC3-306
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-9258 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/mwoolcock

Harvard University - Kennedy School of Government ( email )

Littauer-G-11G
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-0911 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://ksgfaculty.harvard.edu/michael_woolcock

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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