Household Demand for Health Insurance: Price and Spouse's Coverage

33 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2005

See all articles by Marjorie Honig

Marjorie Honig

Hunter College, City University of New York - Department of Economics

Irena Dushi

U.S. Social Security Administration

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

Demand for employment-based insurance is typically treated as an individual rather than a household decision. Dual-earner households are now the modal U.S. married household, however, and most firms offer family coverage as an option available to employees. Findings from a model estimating married workers' take-up of their own insurance with their own and their spouses' offers indicate that both own price and potential coverage under spouses' plans are important determinants of take-up. We find evidence of selection into jobs offering insurance among wives but not husbands. Findings also suggest that dual-earners are not aware of the potential wage/benefit trade-off. Data are from the 1996 panel of SIPP.

Keywords: employment-based health insurance, wage/benefit trade-off, dual-earner households, health insurance offer and take-up

JEL Classification: I10, J32, J12, J15

Suggested Citation

Honig, Marjorie and Dushi, Irena, Household Demand for Health Insurance: Price and Spouse's Coverage (April 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=801787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.801787

Marjorie Honig (Contact Author)

Hunter College, City University of New York - Department of Economics ( email )

695 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10021
United States
212-772-5397 (Phone)
212-772-5398 (Fax)

Irena Dushi

U.S. Social Security Administration ( email )

Washington, DC 20254
United States

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