Bond Underwriting Fees and Keiretsu Affiliation in Japan

48 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2005

See all articles by Abe de Jong

Abe de Jong

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University

Peter Roosenboom

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

Willem Schramade

NN Investment Partners; RSM Erasmus University

Date Written: June 28, 2005

Abstract

We examine fees on bonds issued by Japanese corporations during the 1994-2002 period. We relate fees to firms’ membership of bank-led (financial) keiretsu. For the full sample of firms, we establish a positive relation between fees and risk factors. Over time, we find that fees have increased for those firms that are related to financial keiretsu, even after controlling for risk factors. But during the same period, fees have fallen for firms not belonging to keiretsu. It seems that, against the background of bond market deregulation and weaker banks, keiretsu membership has become a burden rather than an advantage.

Keywords: Fees, bonds, keiretsu, corporate groups, banks

JEL Classification: G20, G21, G24, G30

Suggested Citation

de Jong, Abe and Roosenboom, Peter and Schramade, Willem, Bond Underwriting Fees and Keiretsu Affiliation in Japan (June 28, 2005). ERIM Report Series Reference No. ERS-2005-038-F&A. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=803404

Abe De Jong

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-25
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31 10 408 1022 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.rsm.nl/people/abe-de-jong/

Peter Roosenboom

Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T09-56
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
+31 10 40 82255 (Phone)

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Willem Schramade (Contact Author)

NN Investment Partners ( email )

Schenkkade 65
Den Haag, 2565 AS
Netherlands
0031615521385 (Phone)

RSM Erasmus University ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T09-53
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

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