Download This PaperDo Managers Withhold Bad News?
54 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2005 Last revised: 27 Apr 2012
Abstract
In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors.
Keywords: Bad News, Conservatism, Disclosure
JEL Classification: G14, G30, K22, M41, M45, D82, M40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
S.P. Kothari (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
E52-325
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0994 (Phone)
617-253-0603 (Fax)
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
The Role of Supplementary Statements with Management Earnings Forecasts
By Amy P. Hutton, Gregory S. Miller, ...
-
By Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik, ...
-
Does Disclosure Deter or Trigger Litigation?
By Laura Casares Field, Michelle Lowry, ...
-
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
By Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik, ...
-
Do Conference Calls Affect Analysts' Forecasts?
By Robert M. Bowen, Angela K. Davis, ...
-
The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature
By Anne Beyer, Daniel A. Cohen, ...
-
Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework
By D. Eric Hirst, Lisa Koonce, ...
-
Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?
By Stephen P. Baginski, John M. Hassell, ...