When Better is Worse: Envy and the Use of Deception in Negotiations

43 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2005

See all articles by Simone Moran

Simone Moran

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Management

Maurice E. Schweitzer

University of Pennsylvania - Operations & Information Management Department

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

In this paper we describe the influence of envy on the use of deception. We find that individuals who envy a counterpart are more likely to deceive them than are individuals who do not envy their counterpart. Across both a scenario and a laboratory study, we explore the influence of envy in a negotiation setting. Negotiations represent a domain in which social comparisons are prevalent and deception poses a particularly important concern. In our studies, we induce envy by providing participants with upward social comparison information. We find that upward social comparisons predictably trigger envy, and that envy promotes deception by increasing perceived gains and decreasing psychological costs of engaging in deceptive behavior. We discuss implications of our results with respect to impression management and emotional intelligence as well as the role of emotions in ethical decision making and negotiations.

Keywords: Deception, envy, negotiations, emotions, social comparison, ethics

Suggested Citation

Moran, Simone and Schweitzer, Maurice E., When Better is Worse: Envy and the Use of Deception in Negotiations (August 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=804844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.804844

Simone Moran (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Management ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 9802 (Phone)
+972 8 647 7697 (Fax)

Maurice E. Schweitzer

University of Pennsylvania - Operations & Information Management Department ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-4776 (Phone)
215-898-3664 (Fax)

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