Two Theories of the Civil Burden of Persuasion

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

See all articles by David H. Kaye

David H. Kaye

Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law; Arizona State University - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law - School of Life Science

Abstract

Several judicial opinions and commentators have suggested that the more-probable-than-not burden of persuasion in civil cases reflects a policy of equalizing the rate or risk of factually erroneous verdicts as between plaintiffs and defendants. Concluding an exchange with Ronald Allen, this paper adheres to the view that the legal standard is better understood in terms of minimizing the expected losses due to such errors.

Keywords: statistical decision theory, burden of persuasion

Suggested Citation

Kaye, David H., Two Theories of the Civil Burden of Persuasion. Law, Probability and Risk, Vol. 2, pp. 9-13, 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=805089

David H. Kaye (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law ( email )

University Park, PA 16802
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.personal.psu.edu/dhk3/index.htm

Arizona State University - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law - School of Life Science ( email )

111 E Taylor St.
Phoenix, AZ 85004
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.personal.psu.edu/dhk3/index.htm

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