Intelligent Trips Implementation: A Strategy for Countries on the Cusp of Development

38 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2005

Abstract

The TRIPS Agreement is an attempt to harmonize national standards for intellectual property protection into an international norm based primarily on the standards utilized by developed countries. In the area of patents, the Agreement generally provides that patents shall be available for any inventions . . . in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of an industrial application. This Article argues that by intelligently implementing the Agreement, that is, by administratively and judicially implementing the patent provisions with an eye to creating both strong patent protection and a robust body of subpatentable information, developing member nations may establish a comparative competitive advantage over developed nations in the Life Sciences industries. The Article explains particularly the factors a developing country should consider when implementing the Agreement in light of current U.S. patent law concerning Life Sciences subject matter. The article also introduces the notion that TRIPS presents a unique opportunity for developing countries to establish and exploit comparative differences between their patent law and U.S. patent law to wrest not only the moral high ground, but also R&D investment, infrastructure, and ultimately technological leadership in an industry previously dominated by developed countries' concerns.

Keywords: Patents, TRIPs, developing countries, Life Sciences, biotechnology, international, intellectual property

Suggested Citation

Petherbridge, Lee, Intelligent Trips Implementation: A Strategy for Countries on the Cusp of Development. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 1029, 2001; republished, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 1133, 2004, Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-28, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=806404

Lee Petherbridge (Contact Author)

Loyola Law School Los Angeles ( email )

919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
United States
213-736-8194 (Phone)
213-380-3769 (Fax)

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