Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-92

9 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2005

See all articles by Werner Güth

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE; Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Tilburg University - CentER

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers).

Keywords: preemptio,; endogenous timing

JEL Classification: C72, D43, L11

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Müller, Wieland and Potters, Johannes (Jan) J. M., Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market (August 2005). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-92, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=807406 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.807406

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A-1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://https://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/

Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/w.mueller-3.htm

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 8204 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

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