Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-92

9 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2005

See all articles by Werner Guth

Werner Guth

Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE; Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Tilburg University - CentER

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers).

Keywords: preemptio,; endogenous timing

JEL Classification: C72, D43, L11

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Müller, Wieland and Potters, Johannes (Jan) J. M., Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market (August 2005). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-92. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=807406 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.807406

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A-1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://https://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/

Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/w.mueller-3.htm

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 8204 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

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