The Different Extent of Privatisation Proceeds in EU Countries: A Preliminary Explanation Using a Public Choice Approach

41 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2005

See all articles by Ansgar Hubertus Belke

Ansgar Hubertus Belke

University of Duisburg-Essen - Department of Economics and Business Administration; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for European Policy Studies

Frank Baumgärtner

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Friedrich Schneider

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Ralph Setzer

Deutsche Bundesbank

Date Written: September 2005

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates the differences in the motives of raising privatisation proceeds for a panel of EU countries from 1990 to 2000. More specifically, we test whether privatisations can be mainly interpreted (a) as ingredients of a larger reform package of economic liberalisation in formerly overregulated economies, (b) as a reaction to an increasing macroeconomic problem pressure and (c) as a means to foster growth and increase tax income and relax the fiscal stance with an eye on the demands by integration of economic and financial markets. Whereas we are able to corroborate claim (a) only partly, we gain consistent evidence in favour of claims (b) and (c).

Keywords: European Union, panel analysis, partisan theory, privatisation proceeds,

JEL Classification: H42, E62, L33

Suggested Citation

Belke, Ansgar Hubertus and Baumgärtner, Frank and Schneider, Friedrich G. and Setzer, Ralph, The Different Extent of Privatisation Proceeds in EU Countries: A Preliminary Explanation Using a Public Choice Approach (September 2005). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1741, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1600, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=814504

Ansgar Hubertus Belke (Contact Author)

University of Duisburg-Essen - Department of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Universitätsstr. 9
Essen, 45141
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for European Policy Studies ( email )

1 Place du Congres, 1000
Brussels, 1000
Belgium

Frank Baumgärtner

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Friedrich G. Schneider

Johannes Kepler University Linz - Department of Economics ( email )

Altenbergerstrasse 69
A-4040 Linz, 4040
Austria
+43 732 2468 8210 (Phone)
+43 732 2468 8208 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Ralph Setzer

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431
Germany

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