Legislative Usurpation: The Early Practice and Constitutional Repudiation of Legislative Intervention in Adjudication

6 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2005  

David Kairys

Temple University - Beasley School of Law

Abstract

In the United States, we usually think of separation of powers as easy and obvious. Legislatures make rules of general application; courts decide cases between parties based on existing law; and executives enforce and implement the laws. Sometimes the lines shift or get fuzzy, but the principle was fundamental to the framers of the Constitution and still has the feel and supporting authority of a foundational precept. However, this was not always so. In the pre-constitutional history of the United States, legislatures regularly exercised judicial functions, intervened in adjudication, and interfered with accrued or vested rights. Congress seems poised to test the basic principle once again with a bill that bars the pending city lawsuits and most other litigation against handgun manufacturers and dealers. This short historical essay addresses the early practice of legislative intervention in litigation and its repudiation by the framers of the Constitution.

Keywords: Separation of powers, legislative usurpation, legislative intervention in adjudication, legislative power, gun litigation

Suggested Citation

Kairys, David, Legislative Usurpation: The Early Practice and Constitutional Repudiation of Legislative Intervention in Adjudication. University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 945-950, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=815245

David Kairys (Contact Author)

Temple University - Beasley School of Law ( email )

1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
127
Rank
184,564
Abstract Views
1,722