A Game Model of Dowry Determination in an Arranged Marriage Context

13 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2005

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Abstract

In many arranged marriage contexts, a mediator assists the bride and the groom's families in determining the actual amount of the dowry. Although social scientists in general and economists in particular have studied many aspects of dowries, to the best of our knowledge, the nature of the interaction between a mediator and the two concerned parties has not been analyzed previously in the literature. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to analyze a simple game model of dowry determination.

Specifically, we first solve for the Nash equilibrium pair of final dowry offers from the two concerned parties. Next, we show how the equilibrium dowry offers optimally trade off the desire to make an assertive offer with the likelihood that this offer will be selected by the mediator.

Keywords: Arranged Marriage, Dowry, Game Model, Mediator, Uncertainty

JEL Classification: J12, O15, D81

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., A Game Model of Dowry Determination in an Arranged Marriage Context. Economics Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 1-8, 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=815945

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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