Antitrust Regulations in a Global Setting: The EU Investigation of the Ge/Honeywell Merger

Posted: 30 Sep 2005

See all articles by Mihir A. Desai

Mihir A. Desai

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Mark F. Veblen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Belen Villalonga

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Date Written: December 23, 2003

Abstract

SUBJECT AREAS: Antitrust laws, Business government relations, Competition, Industrial policy, Mergers, Regulatory agencies

CASE SETTINGS: Brussels; Aerospace Industry; 2001

Helps students understand the principles underlying competition and antitrust policy in the context of the proposed GE-Honeywell merger. The U.S. Department of Justice has already approved the transaction and it is being considered by the European Commission. The Competition Commissioner, Mario Monti, must analyze the economic consequences of the proposed merger and evaluate how it will affect competitors, customers, and product markets. He must also address key policy choices. In understanding the nuances of the transaction, students identify different sources of value and must confront the question of whether the efficiencies generated enhance social welfare in the long run. The decision of whether to approve the merger, and on what terms, provides students with insights into the complexities of operating under multiple regulatory regimes.

Suggested Citation

Desai, Mihir A. and Veblen, Mark F. and Villalonga, Belen, Antitrust Regulations in a Global Setting: The EU Investigation of the Ge/Honeywell Merger (December 23, 2003). HBS Publishing Case No.: 9-204-081; Teaching Note No.: 5-205-094. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=817169

Mihir A. Desai (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6693 (Phone)
617-496-6592 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Mark F. Veblen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Belen Villalonga

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

40 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

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