IGIER Working Paper No. 114
37 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 1997
Date Written: September 1997
We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government.
JEL Classification: A10, H00, D72, D78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Persson, Torsten and Roland, Gérard and Tabellini, Guido, Comparative Politics and Public Finance (September 1997). IGIER Working Paper No. 114. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=82669 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.82669