The Discriminatory Incentives to Bundle in the Cable Television Industry

40 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2020

See all articles by Gregory S. Crawford

Gregory S. Crawford

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 19, 2005

Abstract

An influential theoretical literature supports a discriminatory explanation for product bundling: it reduces consumer heterogeneity, extracting surplus in a manner similar to 2nd-degree price discrimination. This paper tests this theory and quantifies its importance in the cable television industry. The results provide strong support for the theory and suggest that bundling an average top-15 cable network yields a heterogeneity reduction equal to a 6.0% increase in firm profits (and 5.5% reduction in consumers surplus). The results are robust to alternative explanations for bundling.

Keywords: Bundling, price discrimination, cable television

JEL Classification: L12, M31, L96, L40, L50, C31

Suggested Citation

Crawford, Gregory S., The Discriminatory Incentives to Bundle in the Cable Television Industry (July 19, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=829286 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.829286

Gregory S. Crawford (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Schönberggasse 1
Zürich, CH-8001
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/faculty/groupcrawford.html

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
381
Abstract Views
3,463
Rank
157,125
PlumX Metrics