Monopoly Quality Degradation and Regulation in Cable Television
47 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2005
Date Written: September 30, 2005
Abstract
Using an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model of monopoly quality choice, we calculate the degree of quality degradation in cable television markets and the impact of regulation on those choices. We find lower bounds of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45% of offered service qualities. Furthermore, cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight offer significantly higher quality, less degradation, and greater quality per dollar, despite higher prices.
Keywords: monopoly, quality, regulation, cable television
JEL Classification: L12, L50, L96, L43, D42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
The Discriminatory Incentives to Bundle in the Cable Television Industry
-
Nearly Optimal Pricing for Multiproduct Firms
By Chenghuan Sean Chu, Phillip Leslie, ...
-
Price Discrimination and Copyright Law: Evidence from the Introduction of Dvds
-
The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets
By Gregory S. Crawford and Ali Yurukoglu
-
The Use of Full-Line Forcing Contracts in the Video Rental Industry
-
The Use of Full-Line Forcing Contracts in the Video Rental Industry
-
Estimating the Effects of a la Carte Pricing: The Case of Cable Television