The Role of Voluntary Frameworks in Multinational Cooperation

Abstract

In the last decade, the number of jurisdictions developing and enforcing merger regimes has increased systematically. This valuable multitude improved the monitoring of merger activities promoting economic performance and ensuring costumer welfare. Yet, a notable 'side effect' of this multitude has been the increased complexity of approving merger transactions. For the undertakings these 'side effects' have reduced the legal certainty and increased the costs associated with the transaction.

The competition agencies on the other hand suffer from overlapping jurisdictions which increases the likelihood for conflicting decisions and tension between agencies appraising the same transaction.

Although many agree that greater cooperation in merger regulation is required, an effective vehicle that would negate present inefficiencies and notable friction for both the agencies and the undertakings does not yet exist.

This essay explores the obstacles that hinder cooperative developments at the multinational level of merger control. It then explores attempts to monitor merger and acquisition through both binding and voluntary frameworks. The essay goes on to highlight the theoretical superiority of voluntary frameworks as a detailed mechanism for merger control. Finally, the essay questions the extent to which voluntary frameworks may transform into practice and contribute to the creation of a multinational agreement on merger control.