Influential Evidence in Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission

Issues in Competition Law and Policy

20 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2005 Last revised: 5 Oct 2009

See all articles by Malcolm B. Coate

Malcolm B. Coate

Independent

Shawn W. Ulrick

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

Date Written: January 1, 2008

Abstract

In this study, merger enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission is shown to be affected by structural variables (the Herfindahl, the change in the Herfindahl, and the number of significant rivals), an entry index, and three evidence variables (hot documents, validated customer complaints, and event analyses). The paper discusses how theoretical implications of either coordinated interaction or unilateral effects may be tested with evidence gathered during the merger review process. Predictions for a number of (unnamed) transactions filed during fiscal year 2004 are given to illustrate that the available models are able to explain enforcement action at the Commission.

Keywords: Merger Guidelines, Merger Enforcement, Federal Trade Commission

JEL Classification: K21, L20

Suggested Citation

Coate, Malcolm B. and Ulrick, Shawn W., Influential Evidence in Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission (January 1, 2008). Issues in Competition Law and Policy, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=835824

Shawn W. Ulrick

U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ( email )

600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

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