Influential Evidence in Merger Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission
Issues in Competition Law and Policy
20 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2005 Last revised: 5 Oct 2009
Date Written: January 1, 2008
In this study, merger enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission is shown to be affected by structural variables (the Herfindahl, the change in the Herfindahl, and the number of significant rivals), an entry index, and three evidence variables (hot documents, validated customer complaints, and event analyses). The paper discusses how theoretical implications of either coordinated interaction or unilateral effects may be tested with evidence gathered during the merger review process. Predictions for a number of (unnamed) transactions filed during fiscal year 2004 are given to illustrate that the available models are able to explain enforcement action at the Commission.
Keywords: Merger Guidelines, Merger Enforcement, Federal Trade Commission
JEL Classification: K21, L20
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation