Structural Reform Litigation: Remedial Bargaining and Bureaucratic Drift

41 Pages Posted: 7 Nov 2005

See all articles by Anthony M. Bertelli

Anthony M. Bertelli

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics; Pennsylvania State University

Sven E. Feldmann

Melbourne Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift.

Keywords: public law litigation, agency, bureaucratic drift, bargaining, enforcement

JEL Classification: K23

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M. and Feldmann, Sven E., Structural Reform Litigation: Remedial Bargaining and Bureaucratic Drift (August 2005 ). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=839426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.839426

Anthony M. Bertelli (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - DONDENA - Carlo F. Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://tonybertelli.com

Sven E. Feldmann

Melbourne Business School ( email )

200 Leicester Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053 3186
Australia
+61 3 9349 8171 (Phone)
+61 3 9349 8144 (Fax)

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