Management of Public Accounting Firms: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same?

10 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2005 Last revised: 12 Jun 2013

See all articles by Michael Gibbins

Michael Gibbins

University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems

Karim Jamal

University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems

Date Written: November 13, 2005

Abstract

In recent years public accounting firms have been caught in a media firestorm fuelled by corporate fraud, disappointed investors and aggressive regulators. The collapse of Arthur Andersen, attributed partly to the way the firm was managed, including incentives for partner performance, and stories of cozy auditor-client relations involving numerous firms, have triggered questions about how well accounting firms are managed. Some former Arthur Andersen partners (e.g., Wyatt 2004; Toffler 2003) have proposed that greed and mismanagement by senior partners contributed to the demise of Arthur Andersen. Much of the trouble happened in the US - what about Canada? Have the management practices of Canadian public accounting firms changed after all this?

JEL Classification: M41, M49, M47, G38

Suggested Citation

Gibbins, Michael and Jamal, Karim, Management of Public Accounting Firms: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same? (November 13, 2005). University of Alberta School of Business Research Paper No. 2013-1009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=840924 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.840924

Michael Gibbins

University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-2718 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

Karim Jamal (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Accounting, Operations & Information Systems ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-5829 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

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