Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
UPF Economics and Business Working Paper 783
24 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2005
Date Written: October 24, 2004
In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.
Keywords: Uncoupled, Nash equilibrium, stochastic dynamics, bounded recall
JEL Classification: C7, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation