Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper 783

24 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2005

See all articles by Andreu Mas-Colell

Andreu Mas-Colell

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Sergiu Hart

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality

Date Written: October 24, 2004

Abstract

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

Keywords: Uncoupled, Nash equilibrium, stochastic dynamics, bounded recall

JEL Classification: C7, D83

Suggested Citation

Mas-Colell, Andreu and Hart, Sergiu, Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (October 24, 2004). UPF Economics and Business Working Paper 783, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=848684 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.848684

Andreu Mas-Colell (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(34-3) 542 20 58 (Phone)
(34-3) 542 12 23 (Fax)

Sergiu Hart

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email )

Feldman Building
Givat-Ram
Jerusalem, 91904
Israel
+972-2-6584135 (Phone)
+972-2-6513681 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart

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