Download This PaperTinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games
19 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2005
Date Written: November 2005
Abstract
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.
Keywords: : Policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability, Nash equilibrium existence
JEL Classification: C72, E52, E61
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni and Acocella, Nicola, Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games (November 2005). FEEM Working Paper No. 132.05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=849025 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.849025
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