Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

19 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2005

See all articles by Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law

Nicola Acocella

University of Rome I - Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance (MEMOTEF)

Date Written: November 2005

Abstract

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

Keywords: : Policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability, Nash equilibrium existence

JEL Classification: C72, E52, E61

Suggested Citation

Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni and Acocella, Nicola, Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games (November 2005). FEEM Working Paper No. 132.05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=849025 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.849025

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (Contact Author)

Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law ( email )

via Castro del Laurenziano 9
Roma, 00191
Italy

Nicola Acocella

University of Rome I - Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance (MEMOTEF) ( email )

Via del Castro Laurenziano 9
Roma, Roma 00161
Italy
+390649766359 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.memotef.uniroma1.it/newdip/utenti/acocellanicola/

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