Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games
19 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2005
Date Written: November 2005
Abstract
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.
Keywords: : Policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability, Nash equilibrium existence
JEL Classification: C72, E52, E61
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory
By Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí, ...
-
The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective
By Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí, ...
-
The Science of Monetary Policy: a New Keynesian Perspective
By Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí, ...
-
An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy: Expanded Version
-
Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence
By Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí, ...
-
Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets