A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms

CERGE-EI Working Paper No 246

15 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2005

See all articles by Jakub Steiner

Jakub Steiner

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute)

Abstract

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.

Keywords: Reciprocity, Emotions, Commitment, Punishment, Public Good

JEL Classification: D64, H41, Z13

Suggested Citation

Steiner, Jakub, A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms . CERGE-EI Working Paper No 246, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=849171

Jakub Steiner (Contact Author)

Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) ( email )

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Prague 1, 111 21
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