A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms
CERGE-EI Working Paper No 246
15 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2005
Abstract
It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.
Keywords: Reciprocity, Emotions, Commitment, Punishment, Public Good
JEL Classification: D64, H41, Z13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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