Business Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry

62 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2005 Last revised: 8 Oct 2009

See all articles by Camelia M. Kuhnen

Camelia M. Kuhnen

University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School & NBER

Date Written: November 24, 2008

Abstract

Business connections can mitigate agency conflicts by facilitating efficient information transfers, but can also be channels for inefficient favoritism. I analyze these two effects in the mutual fund industry and find that fund directors and advisory firms that manage the funds hire each other preferentially based on the intensity of their past interactions. I do not find evidence that stronger board-advisor ties correspond to better or worse outcomes for fund shareholders. These results are consistent with the notion that the two effects of board-management connections on investor welfare - improved monitoring and increased potential for collusion - balance out in this setting.

Keywords: Social networks, influence, mutual funds, corporate governance, contracts

JEL Classification: G2, G34, L14

Suggested Citation

Kuhnen, Camelia M., Business Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry (November 24, 2008). Journal of Finance, Vol. 64, No. 5, pp. 2185-2220, October 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=849705

Camelia M. Kuhnen (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School & NBER ( email )

Kenan-Flagler Business School
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States
(919) 9623284 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://public.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/faculty/kuhnenc/

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