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The Strategy of Boilerplate

Robert B. Ahdieh

Emory University School of Law

November 10, 2005

Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-22
Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 05-36

Boilerplate is everywhere. Its use in contracts among unsophisticated parties - and in standard-form contracts between dominant repeat-players and their inexperienced and uncounseled customers - may not be surprising. Yet boilerplate is also pervasive in contracts among sophisticated and recurrent contracting parties, ably represented by well-compensated counsel. While various explanations have been offered for this phenomenon - including transaction cost and network effect theories - the incompleteness of each approach invites further attention to the sources of standardization in contracting. Here, I offer a "strategic" conception of boilerplate in facilitating communication among sophisticated parties.

Contrary to our common emphasis on the element of conflict in bargaining, its essential feature is a dynamic of coordination. Given the resulting mixed-motive game, direct communication may not be the primary means of communication in bargaining. Both the use of boilerplate and deviations from it, by contrast, may speak worlds. Perhaps most significantly, for all the sense of "boilerplate" as somehow passive or inert, it may - in appropriate circumstances - constitute an effective weapon in bargaining parties' efforts to advance their contracting interests.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: boilerplate, bargaining, strategy, contract, adhesion, standard-form, norm, convention, Schelling, focal point, coordination, signaling, communication, cheap talk, indenture

JEL Classification: D74, D82, D84, K12, K22

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Date posted: November 18, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Ahdieh, Robert B., The Strategy of Boilerplate (November 10, 2005). ; Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 05-36. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=849804 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.849804

Contact Information

Robert B. Ahdieh (Contact Author)
Emory University School of Law ( email )
1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-727-4924 (Phone)
404-727-6820 (Fax)

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