Alternative Pension Reform Strategies for Japan

65 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2005

See all articles by David Miles

David Miles

Imperial College Business School; The Bank of England; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Aleš Černý

Cass Business School, City, University of London

Date Written: February 2002

Abstract

This report summarises the research we have undertaken into the implications of various pension reform strategies in Japan. Reform is essential because ageing will generate extreme pressures on the public, unfunded pension system. We consider the macroeconomic, or aggregate, and the distributional implications of reforms that, to varying degrees, would increase reliance upon funded pensions. We also estimate the welfare implications of reforms by calculating the expected gains and losses to households of various generations. We take as a point of reference a scenario where unfunded pensions provide an income to the retired worth a high proportion of salaries at the end of their working life; we take that proportion to be 50% of gross (or around 70% of net) salaries.

Keywords: Aging population, pension reform, Japan

JEL Classification: D91, H55

Suggested Citation

Miles, David Kenneth and Černý, Aleš, Alternative Pension Reform Strategies for Japan (February 2002). Cass Business School Research Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=851236 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.851236

David Kenneth Miles (Contact Author)

Imperial College Business School ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

The Bank of England ( email )

Threadneedle Street
London EC2R 8AH
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Aleš Černý

Cass Business School, City, University of London ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

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