The Incentive to Participate in Open Source Projects: A Signaling Approach

22 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2005

See all articles by Yossi Spiegel

Yossi Spiegel

Tel Aviv University, Coller School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Date Written: October 2005

Abstract

This paper examines the incentives of programmers to contribute to open source software projects on a voluntary basis. In particular, the paper looks at how this incentive changes as (i) performance becomes more visible to the relevant audience, (ii) effort has a stronger impact on performance, and (iii) performance becomes more informative about talent. In all three cases, it is shown that the answer depends on whether we start from a stable or unstable interior equilibrium.

Keywords: open source, signalling

Suggested Citation

Spiegel, Yossi, The Incentive to Participate in Open Source Projects: A Signaling Approach (October 2005). NET Institute Working Paper No. 05-23. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=851265 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.851265

Yossi Spiegel (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University, Coller School of Management ( email )

Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
972-3-640-9063 (Phone)
972-3-640-7739 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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