Financial Crises and Political Crises

33 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2006 Last revised: 10 Mar 2021

See all articles by Roberto Chang

Roberto Chang

Rutgers University, New Brunswick/Piscataway - Faculty of Arts and Sciences-New Brunswick/Piscataway - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: November 2005

Abstract

This paper is an analysis of the simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises and its consequences. It focuses on a small open economy that faces a debt default decision. Crucially, this decision is made by a government that has superior information than the public about the social costs of default. Citizens can dismiss the government, and overrule its default decision, at the cost of a political crisis. If there is a divergence between the objectives of the government and its people, a political crisis may emerge in equilibrium. For this to be the case, the foreign debt must be large enough, and international reserves low. When this political equilibrium is seen as a part of a larger investment problem, there are equilibria in which crises are "only financial," and equilibria in which both default and political crises occur. In some cases, these two kinds of equilibria coexist and, in this sense, a loss of confidence by foreign lenders can exacerbate the likelihood of a political crisis. If so, international intervention in financial markets may ensure financial and political stability at little cost.

Suggested Citation

Chang, Roberto, Financial Crises and Political Crises (November 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11779, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=851688

Roberto Chang (Contact Author)

Rutgers University, New Brunswick/Piscataway - Faculty of Arts and Sciences-New Brunswick/Piscataway - Department of Economics ( email )

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New Brunswick, NJ 08901
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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