The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Programmes

Journal of Legislative Studies 13(2): 280 – 300

24 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2005 Last revised: 6 Dec 2012

See all articles by Bryane Michael

Bryane Michael

University of Oxford

Aare Kasemets

University of Tartu

Date Written: December 1, 2005

Abstract

The "first wave" of donor sponsored anti-corruption programmes usefully focused on elaborating recommendations for parliamentarians or tried to train them (develop human capital) in anti-corruption. Now it time for these programmes to take into account parliamentarian incentives to adopt these recommendations and/or use this "knowledge". This paper will discuss these incentives and the ways these programmes should and can help build political capital by managing voter demands, political competition, patronage, and enforcement. The paper also reviews some basic theories from formal political economy which may be of interest to practitioners interested in bridging the theory/practice gap.

Keywords: anti-corruption, parliamentary, incentive design

JEL Classification: H1

Suggested Citation

Michael, Bryane and Kasemets, Aare, The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Programmes (December 1, 2005). Journal of Legislative Studies 13(2): 280 – 300. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=853944 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.853944

Bryane Michael (Contact Author)

University of Oxford ( email )

South Parks Road
Oxford, Oxfordshire OX1 3QY
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~scat1663/

Aare Kasemets

University of Tartu ( email )

Ülikooli 18
Tartu 50090, 50090
Estonia

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