Bank Control and the Number of Bank Relations of Japanese Firms

40 Pages Posted: 26 Nov 2005

See all articles by Kazuo Ogawa

Kazuo Ogawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Elmer Sterken

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Ichiro Tokutsu

Konan University

Date Written: November 2005

Abstract

We explore the determinants of the number of long-term bank relations of listed Japanese firms using a unique data set covering the period 1982-1999. Japanese listed firms have about seven long-term bank loan relations on average, but show a large variation around the average. We analyze the determinants of the choice for the number of bank relations. We use data on loan and equity ownership to address the impact of the Japan-specific bank-firm relations and bank control on the number of loans decision. Having a relation with a top-equity holding bank reduces the number of bank relations, while debt-rich and cash-poor firms have more bank relations.

Keywords: firm-bank relations, single versus multiple borrowing, bank control, discrete choice models

JEL Classification: G21, G32

Suggested Citation

Ogawa, Kazuo and Sterken, Elmer and Tokutsu, Ichiro, Bank Control and the Number of Bank Relations of Japanese Firms (November 2005). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1589, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=854927 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.854927

Kazuo Ogawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8570 (Phone)

Elmer Sterken (Contact Author)

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business ( email )

Postbus 72
9700 AB Groningen
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Ichiro Tokutsu

Konan University ( email )

8-9-1 Okamoto Higashinadaku
Kobe 658-8501
Japan

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