Collective Reputation and Quality

Posted: 14 Dec 2005

See all articles by Jason A. Winfree

Jason A. Winfree

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor

Jill J. McCluskey

Washington State University

Abstract

Firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality. Collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem. We show that for an experience good without firm traceability, individual firms have the incentive to choose quality levels that are sub-optimal for the group. These results support minimum quality standards. Trigger strategies are analyzed as an alternative solution to this problem. Finally, the implications of these results are discussed as they relate to the case study of Washington apples.

Suggested Citation

Winfree, Jason A. and McCluskey, Jill, Collective Reputation and Quality. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 206-213, February 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=856479 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0002-9092.2005.00712.x

Jason A. Winfree (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor ( email )

500 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
+1 734 647 5424 (Phone)

Jill McCluskey

Washington State University ( email )

School of Economic Sciences
Pullman, WA 99164
509-335-2835 (Phone)

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