Tournaments and Multiple Productive Inputs: The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs

15 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2005

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: November 2005

Abstract

In this paper I consider the desirability of drugs that enhance cognitive abilities in the context of tournaments that are used as optimal labor contracts as in Lazear and Rosen (1981). Such drugs reduce the number of voluntary participants in a tournament, but increase individual and total output. If the tournament is optimally designed, welfare is higher if drugs are available and used.

Keywords: cognitive enhancement drugs, tournament, labor market incentives, doping, entry in tournaments

JEL Classification: D72, D74, L23, M54

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A., Tournaments and Multiple Productive Inputs: The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs (November 2005). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1844, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=857244

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

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Germany

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

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Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Germany

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