Congressional Delegation of Spending Power to the Defense Department in the Post-9-11 Period

19 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2005

See all articles by Philip J. Candreva

Philip J. Candreva

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

L. R. Jones

Naval Postgraduate School

Abstract

The advantages of increased delegation of resource management authority by Congress have long been argued by defense leadership. It is an important issue because of its relevance to congressional assessment of defense management, budget priorities, and how to enforce policy preferences. This paper investigates the series of supplemental appropriations for the war on terrorism to determine (a) under what conditions, and how and why Congress delegates budget authority to defense, (b) what happened with respect to the degree of delegation after appropriation during budget execution, and (c) what this case teaches us about the evolving budgetary relationship between Congress and the Defense Department.

Suggested Citation

Candreva, Philip J. and Jones, L. R., Congressional Delegation of Spending Power to the Defense Department in the Post-9-11 Period. Public Budgeting & Finance, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 1-19, December 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=857740 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2005.00370.x

Philip J. Candreva (Contact Author)

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School ( email )

1 University Circle
Monterey, CA 93943-5001
United States
831-656-2884 (Phone)

L. R. Jones

Naval Postgraduate School ( email )

1 University Circle
Monterey, CA 93943-5001
United States

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