A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium

UPF Working Paper No. 200

Posted: 25 Jun 1997

See all articles by Sergiu Hart

Sergiu Hart

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality

Andreu Mas-Colell

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Date Written: December 1996

Abstract

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In this procedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies (these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptive procedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. To compute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff function and the history of play. We also offer a variation where every player knows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

JEL Classification: C70, C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Hart, Sergiu and Mas-Colell, Andreu, A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium (December 1996). UPF Working Paper No. 200, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=8596

Sergiu Hart

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email )

Feldman Building
Givat-Ram
Jerusalem, 91904
Israel
+972-2-6584135 (Phone)
+972-2-6513681 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart

Andreu Mas-Colell (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(34-3) 542 20 58 (Phone)
(34-3) 542 12 23 (Fax)

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