Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial Evidence

30 Pages Posted: 5 Dec 2005 Last revised: 25 Jul 2010

See all articles by Gerald J. Lobo

Gerald J. Lobo

University of Houston - C.T. Bauer College of Business

Jian Zhou

University of Hawaii at Manoa

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the change in managerial discretion over financial reporting following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter SOX). We document an increase in conservatism in financial reporting following SOX and the resulting requirement by the SEC that financial statements be certified by firms' CEOs and CFOs. First, we find that firms report lower discretionary accruals after SOX than in the period preceding SOX. Second, based on the Basu (1997) measure of conservatism, we find that firms incorporate losses more quickly than gains when they report income in the post-SOX period. These results are obtained with alternative estimation and measurement approaches and after controlling for potentially confounding variables. This empirical evidence suggests that SOX and the resultant SEC certification requirement may have altered management's discretionary reporting behavior to make it more conservative.

Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Conservatism, Discretionary accruals

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JEL Classification: M41, M44, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Lobo, Gerald J. and Zhou, Jian, Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial Evidence. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 57-73, March 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=859624

Gerald J. Lobo

University of Houston - C.T. Bauer College of Business ( email )

Houston, TX 77204-6021
United States
713-743-4838 (Phone)
713-743-4828 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bauer.uh.edu/acct/acctprofile.asp?search=Gerald%20Lobo

Jian Zhou (Contact Author)

University of Hawaii at Manoa ( email )

Honolulu, HI 96822
United States

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