Paternalism and Psychology

22 Pages Posted: 29 Nov 2005

See all articles by Edward L. Glaeser

Edward L. Glaeser

Harvard University - Department of Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2005

Abstract

Does bounded rationality make paternalism more attractive? This Essay argues that errors will be larger when suppliers have stronger incentives or lower costs of persuasion and when consumers have weaker incentives to learn the truth. These comparative statics suggest that bounded rationality will often increase the costs of government decisionmaking relative to private decisionmaking, because consumers have better incentives to overcome errors than government decisionmakers, consumers have stronger incentives to choose well when they are purchasing than when they are voting and it is more costly to change the beliefs of millions of consumers than a handful of bureaucrats. As such, recognizing the limits of human cognition may strengthen the case for limited government.

Suggested Citation

Glaeser, Edward L., Paternalism and Psychology (December 2005). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2097. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=860865 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.860865

Edward L. Glaeser (Contact Author)

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