Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Differentiating between First Offenses and Repeat Offenses

30 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2005  

Bryan C. McCannon

West Virginia University - College of Business & Economics

Date Written: July 9, 2007

Abstract

I present a model where a regulator monitors compliance with a policy by a population of individuals, some of whom repeatedly prefer to violate the policy while others occasionally want to experiment. I show that the regulator can use sanctions, contingent on past violations of the policy, to differentiate between the agents and improve welfare. As a result, a regulator prefers investing in enforcement rather than use maximal sanctions.

Keywords: experimentation, overdeterrence, regulation, repeat offenses, underdeterrence

JEL Classification: K4, D6

Suggested Citation

McCannon, Bryan C., Differentiating between First Offenses and Repeat Offenses (July 9, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=865084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.865084

Bryan C. McCannon (Contact Author)

West Virginia University - College of Business & Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
58
Rank
308,934
Abstract Views
1,427