Epistemic Foundations of Solution Concept in Game Theory: An Introduction

UC Davis Working Paper No. 97-21

Posted: 23 Jul 1997

See all articles by Giacomo Bonanno

Giacomo Bonanno

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Klaus Nehring

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 1997

Abstract

We give an introduction to the literature on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts in game theory. Only normal-form games are considered. The solution concepts analyzed are rationalizability, strong rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. The analysis is carried out locally in terms of properties of the belief hierarchies. Several examples are used throughout to illustrate definitions and concepts.

JEL Classification: C70

Suggested Citation

Bonanno, Giacomo F. and Nehring, Klaus, Epistemic Foundations of Solution Concept in Game Theory: An Introduction (June 1997). UC Davis Working Paper No. 97-21. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=8653

Giacomo F. Bonanno (Contact Author)

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
916-752-1574 (Phone)
916-752-9382 (Fax)

Klaus Nehring

University of California, Davis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Shields Drive
Davis, CA 95616-8578
United States
916-752-3379 (Phone)
916-752-9382 (Fax)

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