Download This PaperMultiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions
12 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2005
Date Written: November 2005
Abstract
We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: Correlated Equilibrium Distribution, Implementation, Monotonicity
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ray, Indrajit and Serrano, Roberto and Kar, Anirban, Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions (November 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=869052 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.869052
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