Liberalism, Socialism, and Robust Political Economy

Journal of Markets and Morality, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 99-111, Spring 2004

13 Pages Posted: 14 Dec 2005 Last revised: 27 Feb 2012

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Peter T. Leeson

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Robust political economy requires that both the assumptions of agent benevolence and omniscience be relaxed so that both incentive issues and knowledge problems can be adequately addressed. In this article we seek to (1) develop an understanding of the application of robustness in areas outside of political economy and use this understanding to further our appreciation of the nature of robustness in political economics, (2) explore the robustness of liberalism by considering how it performs under both worst-case motivation conditions and worst-case information conditions in the context of the arguments advanced by the classical economists and Friedrich von Hayek, and (3) explore the fragility of socialism under both best-case incentive conditions and best-case information conditions in the context of the arguments advanced by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek.

Keywords: Robust, Political Economy, Austrian Economics, Classical Liberalism, Hayek, Mises

JEL Classification: B53

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Leeson, Peter T., Liberalism, Socialism, and Robust Political Economy. Journal of Markets and Morality, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 99-111, Spring 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=869124

Peter J. Boettke (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)

Peter T. Leeson

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.peterleeson.com

Paper statistics

Downloads
481
Rank
46,425
Abstract Views
2,657