Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=869142
 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Hayek, Arrow, and the Problems of Democratic Decision-Making


Peter J. Boettke


George Mason University - Department of Economics

Peter T. Leeson


George Mason University - Department of Economics


Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol. 20, 2002

Abstract:     
Both Hayek and Arrow provide arguments about the inability of the vote process to yield a coherent social choice. Hayek demonstrated that planning is incompatible with democracy; its coherence requires dictatorship. Arrow demonstrated that voting fails to produce rational social choices; social rationality can be assured only when there is a single will. In both, the substitution of a single will for many wills is ruled as incompatible with a free society. Because market socialism relies upon either the existence of a meaningful, stable social welfare function or democratic decision-making to allocate resources, the complementary arguments of Hayek and Arrow imply that market socialism requires dictatorship to achieve coherence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 7

Keywords: Social Choice, Austrian Economics

JEL Classification: D71, B53


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: December 14, 2005 ; Last revised: February 27, 2012

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Leeson, Peter T., Hayek, Arrow, and the Problems of Democratic Decision-Making. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol. 20, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=869142

Contact Information

Peter J. Boettke (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)
Peter T. Leeson
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.peterleeson.com
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 977
Downloads: 101
Download Rank: 210,303
Citations:  1