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Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics

28 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2005 Last revised: 25 Oct 2010

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Christopher J. Coyne

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Peter T. Leeson

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 22, 2010

Abstract

Research examining the importance of path dependence and culture for institutions and development tells us 'history matters', but not how history matters. To provide this missing 'how', we provide a framework for understanding institutional 'stickiness' based on the Regression Theorem. The Regression Theorem maintains that the stickiness, and therefore likely success, of any proposed institutional change is a function of that institution's status in relationship to indigenous agents in the previous time period. This framework for analyzing institutional stickiness creates the core of what we call the New Development Economics. Historical cases of post-war reconstruction and transition efforts provide evidence for our claim.

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Coyne, Christopher J. and Leeson, Peter T., Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics (October 22, 2010). American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 67, No. 2, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=869147

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)

Christopher J. Coyne

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Peter T. Leeson (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.peterleeson.com

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