Exclusivity and Antitrust in Media Markets: The Case of Pay-TV in Europe

Posted: 14 Dec 2005

See all articles by Antonio Nicita

Antonio Nicita

University of Siena - Department of Economics

Giovanni Battista Ramello

University of Piemonte Orientale - A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice; International Centre for Economic Research (ICER)

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Abstract

This paper challenges the traditional economic reasons supporting copyright licensing exclusivity in dealership agreements in media markets. It is argued how exclusive dealings in contents distributions acted in Europe as barriers to entry and/or raising rivals' costs strategies against new Pay-TV operators. The removal of exclusive dealing clauses, as recently implemented by the European Commission, can be economically justified when it generates positive impact on technological innovation and on the development of alternative transmission platforms for the delivery of multimedia services. Recent European Antitrust decisions seem to encourage a new 'open access approach' for premium contents distribution in media industry.

Keywords: Exclusive dealings, Copyrights, Market Foreclosure, Pay-TV

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L13, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Nicita, Antonio and Ramello, Giovanni Battista, Exclusivity and Antitrust in Media Markets: The Case of Pay-TV in Europe. International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 371-387, November 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=869364

Antonio Nicita

University of Siena - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza S. Francesco, 7
Siena, I-53100
Italy

Giovanni Battista Ramello (Contact Author)

University of Piemonte Orientale - A. Avogadro - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice ( email )

Via Cavour 84
15100 Alessandria
Italy

International Centre for Economic Research (ICER) ( email )

Villa Gualino
Viale Settimio Severo, 63
10133 Torino
Italy

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